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Abstract. In this paper we propose the opinion leader-follower through mediators systems —
OLFM systems— a multiple-action collective choice model for societies. In those societies three
kind of actors are considered: opinion leaders that can exert certain influence over the decision of
other actors, followers that can be convinced to modify their original decisions, and independent
actors that neither are influenced nor can influence; mediators are actors that both are influenced
and influence other actors. This is a generalization of the opinion leader-follower systems —OLF
systems— proposed by [9].
The satisfaction score is defined on the set of actors. For each actor it measures the number of
society initial decisions in which the final collective decision coincides with the one that the actor
initially selected. We generalize in OLFM systems some properties that the satisfaction score meets
for OLF systems. By using these properties, we provide an axiomatization of the satisfaction score
for the case in which followers maintain their own initial decisions unless all their opinion leaders
share an opposite inclination. This new axiomatization generalizes the one given by [10] for OLF
systems under the same restrictions.
Keywords: Collective choice, Follower, Opinion leader, Mediator, Satisfaction, Axiomatization
1 Introduction
Opinion leadership is a well known and established model for communication policy in sociology and
marketing. It comes from the two-step flow of communication theory proposed since the 1940s [22]. This
theory recognizes the existence of collective decision making situations in societies formed by actors
called opinion leaders, who exert influence over other kind of actors called the followers, becoming in
a two-step decision process [22,20]. In the first step of the process, all actors receive information from
the environment, generating their own decisions; in the second step, a flow of influence from some actors
over others is able to change the choices of some of them [30].
In general, a collective (choice) decision making model for a finite set of actors defines a collective
(choice) decision function. For any set of decisions taken independently by the actors, and represented
by an initial decision vector or an initial choice vector, this function assigns a collective decision, i.e., an
outcome that corresponds to one of the values “yes” or “no”, “pass” or “reject”, “agree” or “disagree”,
“true” or “false”, 1 or 0, etc. As usual in decision theory, we focus on a binary set of possible decisions
that the actors can take.
Motivated by the theoretical study of the effects that different opinion leader-follower structures can
exert in collective decision making systems, a satisfaction score was defined in [9,10] for an opinion leader-
follower collective decision system —OLF system, in short— which represents societies with opinion
leaders, followers and independent actors. The actors of this latter type neither are influenced nor can
influence other members of the society.
According to [9], the satisfaction of an actor in a society refers to the number of possible decisions
that all actors can take as a group, such that the collective decision coincides with the decision taken by
the actor in the initial choice vector. This general formulation allow us to define the satisfaction score
for a generic collective decision making model. In OLF systems, satisfaction is an essential notion, since
it is the most extensive notion to characterize the position of an actor in a society [10].
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There are several properties that the satisfaction score meets specifically for OLF systems [9]. These
properties are related to the variation of satisfaction for certain actors when the relationship with their
predecessors or successors is modified. If we restrict our attention to unanimity, i.e., the specific case
when the followers maintain their own initial decisions unless all their opinion leaders share an opposite
inclination —in which case the follower is convinced by their opinion leaders— then it can be defined
an axiomatization of the satisfaction score [10]. Unanimity is a usual restriction, whose application has
been experimentally used in multiple times. For instance, in a recent experiment it was found that actors
were more likely to conform the attitudes expressed by a unanimous group than by a non-unanimous
group [31].
Several efforts have been made to find axiomatizations for measures or scores related to decision
systems and cooperative games. Moreover, several of these efforts concern to the Banzhaf value [13,23,7,8],
which is a well known power index of simple games, that we shall see is closely related with the satisfaction.
The axiomatizations are relevant to know exactly what properties satisfies a measure in a collective
decision making model.
In this paper we propose a generalization of the OLF systems, namely the OLFM systems, based on
a collective decision making model introduced in [24], that provides actors called mediators that behave
at the same time like opinion leaders and followers. The mediators act as intermediate layers of actors,
that moderate the influence of opinion leaders over followers, helping us to describe a “more-than-two-
step” flow of communication. This scenario allows to analyze societies where there are several layers
of influence, establishing a more complex hierarchy among the different actors. Furthermore, we also
show an axiomatization for the satisfaction score in OLFM systems, by using generalized versions of the
properties used for the same score in OLF systems.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define satisfaction and associate this measure with
two well known power indices of simple game theory, namely the Rae index and the Banzhaf index.
Section 3 presents the original OLF systems defined in [9,10], showing the collective decision function of
the model, and the axiomatization of the satisfaction for this model. Section 4 presents the generalization
of the OLF model through the use of mediators, it defines the generalized versions of the properties of
satisfaction, and also defines the new axiomatization. The paper finishes with some conclusions and
remarks.
2 Simple games and Satisfaction
Let V be a set of actors, as usual n = |V | denotes the number of actors of the system. In general, a
collective decision making model M for a set of n actors defines a collective decision function CM(x),
where x ∈ {0, 1}n is the initial decision vector of the actors, assigning one of the values 1 or 0 as collective
decision; value 1 represents the decision “yes”, and value 0 the decision “no” of an actor.
Abusing of notation, we may consider a collective decision making model CM(X) instead of CM(x),
where i ∈ X ⊆ 2V if and only if the i-th component of x is 1, i.e., xi = 1.
Definition 1. We said that x ∈ {0, 1}n is an initial decision vector, when xi represents the initial
decision of the i-th actor of some decision system.
A well known and deeply studied decision system is the one of simple games, a class of cooperative
games equivalent to monotone Boolean functions [29].
Definition 2. A simple game is a pair Γ = (V,W), where V is a set of actors or players, and W its
set of winning coalitions such that for all X,Y ⊆ V , if X ∈ W and X ⊆ Z, then Z ∈ W.
Observe that we can associate to any simple game a collective decision function in a natural way. Let
x ∈ {0, 1}n be an initial decision vector of the players, the collective decision function associated to Γ is
defined as follows:
CΓ (x) =
{
1 if X(x) ∈ W ,
0 otherwise
where X(x) = {i ∈ V | xi = 1}. In simple games as a collective decision making model, it is relevant
to study the importance of the players in the decision-making process. In this context, the measures or
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scores of the players are known as values or power indices. One of the most classic and popular power
indices is the Banzhaf value, that corresponds to the proportion of coalitions in which a player plays a
critical role [27,1,12].
Definition 3. Let Γ = (V,W) be a simple game and i ∈ V an actor or player. The Banzhaf value Bz(i)
is the number of coalitions in which i is critical, i.e., Bz(i) = |{X ⊆ V | X ∈ W and X \ {i} /∈ W}|.
Besides the critical players, now we mention other two kind of players [29].
Definition 4. Let (V,W) be a simple game and i ∈ V a player:
– i is a dummy if and only for all X ⊆ V , X ∈ W implies X \ {i} ∈ W;
– i is a dictator if and only if for all X ⊆ V , X ∈ W if and only if i ∈ X.
Now we define the satisfaction score in general terms, for any collective decision making model.
Definition 5. Let M be a collective decision making model over a set of n actors. The satisfaction score
of the actor i is defined as follows:
SatM(i) = |{x ∈ {0, 1}
n | CM(x) = xi}|.
It is interesting to note that when the collective decision making modelM is monotonic, with respect
to inclusion, the satisfaction score coincides with the known Rae index. This power index was introduced
by [28] for anonymous games and afterwards it was applied by [13] for simple games, being defined as
follows:
Rae(i) = |{X ⊆ V | i ∈ X ∈ W or i /∈ X /∈ W}|.
In the context of simple games, [13] established an affine-linear relation between the Rae index and
the Banzhaf value [21]:
Sat(i) = Rae(i) = 2n−1 +Bz(i) (1)
It is clear that this equality holds for any collective decision making model that is monotonic. Later,
in Lemma 2 we show that the OLF systems —and therefore its generalization, the OLFM systems— are
monotonic, so the just mentioned equality also applies for them.
Lemma 1. LetM be any monotonic collective decision making model. For any player i we have Sat(i) ≥
2n−1. Moreover, if i is a dummy then Sat(i) = 2n−1, and if i is a dictator then Sat(i) = 2n.
Proof. The sentence Sat(i) ≥ 2n−1 is deduced from the equation (1). It is well known that if i is a
dummy, then Bz(i) = 0, so then Sat(i) = 2n−1. If i is dictator, then for any coalition X ⊆ V , if X ∈ W
then i ∈ X , and if X 6∈ W then i 6∈ X , so hence Sat(i) = 2n. ⊓⊔
Definition 5 helps to see the relationship among the satisfaction and both the Rae index and the
Banzhaf value. However, there exists an equivalent definition of satisfaction, that facilitates the proofs
of the results of the paper [9].
Definition 6. Let M be a collective decision making model over a set of n actors. The satisfaction score
of the actor i can also be defined as follows:
SatM(i) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
SatM(i, x) (2)
where
SatM(i, x) =
{
1 if CM(x) = xi
0 otherwise
In what follows, we use simply Sat(i, x) and Sat(i) when there is no risk of confusion about M.
3
3 OLF systems
The outcome of the model presented in this section is computed by influence interactions in a directed
bipartite graph. At the end of the process all actors arrive to an stable solution and the collective decision
function corresponds to the simple majority voting system.
We use standard notation for graphs [6]: G = (V,E) is a directed graph, V (G) denotes the set of
vertices or actors, and E(G) is the set of edges, i.e., the set of relations among the actors. We use simply
V and E when there is no risk of confusion. For each i ∈ V , SG(i) = {j ∈ V | (i, j) ∈ E} denotes the set
of successors of i, and PG(i) = {j ∈ V | (j, i) ∈ E} the set of predecessors of i. Let δ−(i) = |PG(i)| and
δ+(i) = |SG(i)| be the indegree and the outdegree of the node i, respectively.
Furthermore, we denote P(V (G)) as the power set of V (G). Let x ∈ {0, 1}n be a binary vector and
xi ∈ {0, 1} its i-th component, then x + i and x − i denote an addition and a substraction of the i-th
actor of x, respectively, that is, to assign 1 or 0 to the i-th component of x, respectively.
The model can be formalized as follows.
Definition 7. An opinion leader-follower system S —OLF system, in short— for a set of n actors is
given by a bipartite digraph G = (V,E), representing the actors’ relation, such that the set V is partitioned
into three subsets:
– The opinion leaders: L(G) = {i ∈ V | PG(i) = ∅ and SG(i) 6= ∅}.
– The followers: F(G) = {i ∈ V | PG(i) 6= ∅ and SG(i) = ∅}.
– The independent actors: I(G) = {i ∈ V | PG(i) = ∅ and SG(i) = ∅}.
When there is no risk of ambiguity, we simply use S(i), P (i), I, L or F instead of SG(i), PG(i), I(G),
L(G) or F(G). Note that in an OLF system S = (V,E), if (i, j) ∈ E then i ∈ L and j ∈ F.
Now we define the collective decision process of an OLF system, according to the unanimity restriction
considered by [10].
Definition 8. Given an OLF system S, the collective decision vector c = cS(x) associated to an initial
decision vector x is defined as
ci =
{
b if xj = b for all j ∈ PG(i),
xi otherwise
(3)
such that followers maintain their own initial decisions unless all their opinion leaders share an opposite
inclination. Thus, restrincting our analysis to situations in which n is an odd number, the collective
decision function CS(x) is defined as
CS(x) =
{
1 if |{i ∈ V | ci = 1}| > |{i ∈ V | ci = 0}|,
0 if |{i ∈ V | ci = 1}| < |{i ∈ V | ci = 0}|.
(4)
corresponding to the alternative with the greatest number of “votes” in the final choice vector.
Observe that an OLF system requires the number of actors to be odd in order to ensure that decisions
by the simple majority rule can be reached [9,10]. That is why inequalities in expression (4) are strict.
If we want to consider an even number of actors, we could just replace either > by ≥ or < by ≤ in
expression (4), in which case the results of the paper remain.
Furthermore, both leaders and independent actors always follow their own inclinations in the collective
choice decision vector. A follower follows the unanimous decision among its predecessors or their own
inclination.
Example 1. Figure 1 illustrates a bipartite digraph G = (V,E) corresponding to an OLF system over a
set of five actors. For both initial decision vectors x = (0, 1, 1, 1, 0) and y = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0) we obtain the
same collective decision vector cS(x) = cS(y) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0) and the same collective decision CS(x) =
CS(y) = 1.
We finish this section with a preliminary result regarding the collective decision function of OLF
systems. Recall from Section 2 that the satisfaction score corresponds to the Rae index only for collective
decision making models that are monotonic.
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Fig. 1. Example of an opinion leader-follower system.
Lemma 2. Let S be an OLF system represented by a graph G, its corresponding collective decision
function is monotonic, with respect to inclusion, on P(V (G)).
Proof. Let be x ∈ {0, 1}n. If i ∈ L ∪ I, as ci(x) = xi and xi ∈ {0, 1}, it is clear that C(x − i) ≤ C(x) ≤
C(x+ i). If i ∈ F, we have three possibilities:
1) xi = 0 and ci(x) = 1, which implies ci(x + i) = 1, so C(x) ≤ C(x + i);
2) xi = 1 and ci(x) = 0, which implies ci(x − i) = 0, so C(x − i) ≤ C(x); and
3) xi = ci(x), which is the same case as for opinion leaders and independent actors. ⊓⊔
3.1 Properties and axiomatization for Sat in OLF systems
For what follows, we denote a score as a function f : V → R that assigns some real value to each actor
of the system. The following properties were introduced by [9,10].
Definition 9. Let S and S ′ be two OLF systems represented by the graphs G and G′, respectively, such
that V (G) = V (G′). Let i, j, h be three different actors. We say that a measure given by the function
f : V → R satisfies the properties:
1. Symmetry: if S(i) = S(j) and P (i) = P (j), then f(i) = f(j).
2. Dictator property: if S(i) = V \{i}, then f(i) = 2n.
3. Dictated independence: if |PG(i)| = |PG′(i)| = 1, then fS(i) = fS′(i).
4. Equal gain property: if i ∈ L ∪ I, j ∈ F and E(G′) = E(G) ∪ {(i, j)},
then fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS′(j)− fS(j).
5. Opposite gain property: if i ∈ L ∪ I, j ∈ I and E(G′) = E(G) ∪ {(i, j)},
then fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS(j)− fS′(j).
6. Horizontal neutrality: if i ∈ L ∪ I, j ∈ F, h ∈ L, E(G′) = E(G) ∪ {(i, j)} and h ∈ PG(j),
then fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS(h)− fS′(h).
The above are desirable properties for scores. The symmetry property means that the score for
actors with a symmetric position in the system is the same. A non-symmetrical measure could lead to
unconventional results, e.g., two independent actors with different scores.
In this context, a dictator is an actor that points to all other actors of the system. Hence, in OLF
systems there may be at most one dictator, and if n > 1, the dictator is always an opinion leader.
Furthermore, if there is a dictator, then all other actors follow this actor, so they adopt as final decision
the initial decision of the dictator. The dictator property states that the dictators have the highest score
as possible. Observe that this notion corresponds to the dictator player of simple games introduced in
Definition 4. Furthermore, this property is closely related to Lemma 1.
The dictated independence states that all the followers with only one opinion leader have the same
score. However, note that a follower who has only one opinion leader has always to follow this opinion
leader. Therefore, since any actor with only one predecessor is a dummy, then for Lemma 1 the dictated
independece is equivalent to the following:
if |P (i)| = 1, then f(i) = 2n−1.
The remaining properties involve changes in the structure of the OLF systems, by assigning to an
actor a new opinion leader. These properties were inspired by similar properties for solution concepts
in cooperative game theory [9,8]. One of the most relevant criteria to define a solution concept for
cooperative games is the fairness, i.e., how well each player’s payoff reflects its contribution [14,11]. The
most common solution concepts based on the fairness criterion are the power indices, and as we mention
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in Section 2, the satisfaction score is indeed equivalent to the Rae index, and it is closely related with the
Banzhaf value. In particular, the equal gain property is closely related with the fairness concept by [26].
In a reasonable score, the addition of an influence relationship —a directed edge— from one actor
to another should increase the score of the first actor, because now it is exerting more influence in the
system. In this scenario, we can consider two cases:
On the one hand, if the influenced actor was a follower before the addition of the edge, then the score
of this follower should also increase, because now it is more difficult to change its initial decision. The
equal gain property states that when a follower gets an additional opinion leader, the changes in scores
of this follower and of its new opinion leader are the same. For a score that does not meet this property,
the addition of a relationship between these kind of actors could be unfair for one of them.
On the other hand, if the influenced actor was an independent actor, then the score of this actor
should decrease, because its final decision now depends of the initial decision of the opinion leader. The
opposite gain property states that when an independent actor gets an opinion leader, the sum of the
scores of these two actors does not change. For a score that does not meet this property, the addition
of a relationship between two actors could be unfair for the opinion leader, because it is not getting a
profit according to the effort it took to influence the independent actor.
Finally, horizontal neutrality is inspired by the properties considered for collusion of players in coop-
erative games with transferable utility [23,18,8]. This property states that, if a follower with at least one
opinion leader gets an additional opinion leader, then the sum of scores of the old and new opinion leaders
does not change. This means that the increase in the score for the new opinion leader comes fully from
a decrease in the score for the other opinion leaders. For a score that does not meet this property, the
new opinion leader could not get a profit according to the effort it took to influence an additional follower.
It is known that these properties hold for Sat in OLF systems.
Theorem 1 ([9,10]). For OLF systems, the Sat score satisfies the six properties of Definition 9.
To show the axiomatization of satisfaction in OLF systems, [10] introduced an additional axiom, which
corresponds to the total sum of the satisfaction scores over all actors, i.e., a satisfaction normalization.
Definition 10. Let S be an OLF system represented by a graph G = (V,E). A score given by the
function f : V → R is normalized if it satisfies the following property:
7. Satisfaction normalization:∑
i∈V f(i) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n |{i ∈ V | C(x) = xi}|.
Thus, these seven properties provide an axiomatization of the satisfaction for OLF systems.
Theorem 2 ([10]). For OLF systems, the Sat score is the unique measure that satisfies the properties
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Definitions 9 and 10.
4 Generalized model: OLFM systems
In this section we propose the opinion leader-follower through mediators systems —OLFM systems—
as a generalization of the OLF systems. OLFM systems allow to model decision making situations with
mediators, i.e., actors that behave as opinion leaders and followers, in the sense that they receive their
influence from opinion leaders or other mediators, and can influence the followers or other mediators.
Therefore, while OLF systems are supported on directed bipartite graphs, OLFM systems are sup-
ported on layered digraphs.
Definition 11. A layered digraph is a digraph G = (V,E) where V can be partitioned into k subsets
L1, . . . ,Lk called layers, so that every edge connects a vertex from one layer to another vertex in a layer
immediately below, i.e., for all (a, b) ∈ E, a ∈ Li and b ∈ Li+1, for some 1 ≤ i < k.
This generalization allows to represent more complex social structures in which there are more than
only two hierarchical levels.
6
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Fig. 2. An OLFM system with one layer of mediation.
Definition 12. An opinion leader-follower through mediators system S —an OLFM system, in short—
for a set of n actors is given by a layered digraph G = (V,E), such that the set V is partitioned into four
subsets:
– The opinion leaders: L(G) = {i ∈ V | PG(i) = ∅ and SG(i) 6= ∅}.
– The followers: F(G) = {i ∈ V | PG(i) 6= ∅ and SG(i) = ∅}.
– The independent actors: I(G) = {i ∈ V | PG(i) = ∅ and SG(i) = ∅}.
– The mediators: M(G) = {i ∈ V | PG(i) 6= ∅ and SG(i) 6= ∅}.
As for OLF systems, for OLFM systems we also restrict our attention to an odd number of actors.
Both the collective decision vector and the collective decision function of the system is the same than for
OLF systems —see expressions (3) and (4) in Definition 8—. However, here the collective decision vector
must be determined in order, starting from the actors in the first layer, then the ones in the second layer,
and so on.
Observe that the opinion leaders and independent actors belong to the first layer of the graph, L1.
The mediators are distributed into layers of mediation, whereas there are no mediators pointing to upper
layers. The opinion leaders can only be connected with the mediators of the first layer of mediation, L2;
the mediators of the last layer of mediation can only be connected with the followers, and the mediators of
interlayers can only be connected with the mediators of the layer immediately below. Moreover, L1 = L∪I
and for all i ∈ Lk, i ∈ F. Hence, the OLF systems can be seen as OLFM systems with only two layers,
i.e., with k = 2.
Note also that the influence of actors in higher layers can affect the actors’ decision in much lower
layers. From Lemma 2, it is easy to see that the collective decision function under OLFM systems —like
in the OLF systems— is monotonic.
Example 2. Figure 2 illustrates a graph G corresponding to an OLFM system over a set of seven actors.
Here L = {1, 2}, I = {3}, M = {4, 5} and F = {6, 7}. The computation of the collective decision function
is shown in Table 1, where the initial decision vectors are ordered according to binary numeration.
The vertical suspension points on the table indicate that both the collective decision vector and
the collective decision function are the same than for the previous and the next decision vector. Thus,
according to our computation we have Sat(1) = 104, Sat(2) = Sat(5) = 88, Sat(3) = Sat(7) = 72 and
Sat(4) = Sat(6) = 64.
It is interesting to note that in OLFM systems, instead of OLF systems, the actors of the same kind
may not have the same satisfaction score. Observe that in Example 2, for instance, the satisfaction of
a follower may be greater than the satisfaction of a mediator, and equal than the satisfaction of an
independent actor.
4.1 Properties and axiomatization for Sat in OLFM systems
In this subsection we shall prove first that all the properties for satisfaction in OLF systems also apply
for OLFM systems. However, to establish an axiomatization in OLFM systems, we need to generalize
the equal gain property and the opposite gain property, in order to consider the mediators in the layered
graphs. Although it is not required for the axiomatization, we also introduce a generalization of the
horizontal neutrality that is fulfilled for satisfaction in OLFM systems.
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x c(x) C(x) x c(x) C(x) x c(x) C(x)
0000000 0110100 0110110 1 1001110 1001101 1... 0000000 0 0110101 0110111 1 1001111 1001101 1
0001111 0110110 0110110 1 1010000 1011000 0
0010000 0110111 0110111 1 1010001 1011001 1... 0010000 0 0111000 0110010 0 1010010 1011000 0
0011111 0111001 0110010 0 1010011 1011001 1
0100000 0100010 0 0111010 0110010 0 1010100 1011101 1
0100001 0100010 0 0111011 0110010 0 1010101 1011101 1
0100010 0100010 0 0111100 0110110 1 1010110 1011101 1
0100011 0100010 0 0111101 0110111 1 1010111 1011101 1
0100100 0100110 0 0111110 0110110 1 1011000 1011000 0
0100101 0100111 1 0111111 0110111 1 1011001 1011001 1
0100110 0100110 0 1000000 1001000 0 1011010 1011000 0
0100111 0100111 1 1000001 1001001 0 1011011 1011001 1
0101000 0100000 0 1000010 1001000 0 1011100 1011101 1
0101001 0100000 0 1000011 1001001 0 1011101 1011101 1
0101010 0100010 0 1000100 1001101 1 1011110 1011101 1
0101011 0100010 0 1000101 1001101 1 1011111 1011101 1
0101100 0100110 0 1000110 1001101 1 1100000
0101101 0100111 1 1000111 1001101 1
... 1101111 1
0101110 0100110 0 1001000 1001000 0 1101111
0101111 0100111 1 1001001 1001001 0 1110000
0110000 0110010 0 1001010 1001000 0
... 1111111 1
0110001 0110010 0 1001011 1001001 0 1111111
0110010 0110010 0 1001100 1001101 1
0110011 0110010 0 1001101 1001101 1
Table 1. Collective decision function for an OLFM system.
Definition 13. Let S and S ′ be two OLFM systems represented by the graphs G and G′, respectively,
such that V (G) = V (G′). Let i, j, h be three different actors, and k ∈ N such that k ≥ 0. We say that a
measure given by the function f : V → R satisfies the properties:
4b Equal absolute change property:
if i ∈ Lk−1, j ∈ Lk and E(G
′) = E(G) ∪ {(i, j)},
then either fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS′(j)− fS(j) or fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS(j)− fS′(j).
5b Opposite gain property:
if i ∈ V , j ∈ I and E(G′) = E(G) ∪ {(i, j)},
then either fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS(j)− fS′(j) or fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS′(j)− fS(j).
6b Power neutrality for two opinion leaders:
if h ∈ Lk−1, i ∈ Lk−1, j ∈ Lk with PG(j) = {h}, and furthermore, E(G′) = E(G) ∪ {(i, j)},
then either fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS(h)− fS′(h) or fS′(i)− fS(i) = fS′(h)− fS(h).
Note that the opposite gain property is a generalization of the property 5 of Definition 9, because
when i ∈ L ∪ I, it only holds fS′(i) − fS(i) = fS(j) − fS′(j). The equal absolute change property is a
generalization of equal gain property, because when i ∈ L∪I, it only holds fS′(i)−fS(i) = fS′(j)−fS(j).
The power neutrality for two opinion leaders is a generalization of horizontal neutrality, because for k = 2,
it only holds fS′(i)−fS(i) = fS(h)−fS′(h). Moreover, the properties 4b and 6b were introduced by [9] for
OLF systems —i.e., OLFM systems with two layers— not restricted to unanimity, i.e., so that followers
can change their decisions based on a majority proportion of their opinion leaders.
The following result proves that all the previous properties are fulfilled by the satisfaction in OLFM
systems.
Theorem 3. For OLFM systems, the Sat score satisfies the properties 1, 2, 3, 4b, 5b and 6b of Defini-
tions 9 and 13.
Proof. For symmetry, for all x ∈ {0, 1}n, P (i) = P (j) implies ci(x) = cj(x). Further, as S(i) = S(j), if
xi 6= xj , then c(x) = c(x − i+ j); and if xi = xj , the satisfaction score does not change for the actors i
and j.
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For the dictator property, if S(i) = V \{i} we have that i ∈ L and |I| = |M| = 0, which is the same
case proved for OLF systems in [9], i.e., as C(x) = xi for all x ∈ {0, 1}n, then Sat(i) = 2n.
For the dictated independence, let be P (i) = {j}, then for all x ∈ {0, 1}n it holds ci(x) = xj , so the
collective choice C(x) is independent of the decision of the actor i. Hence, let be b = {0, 1}, if C(x) = b,
there are exactly 2n−1 initial decision vectors with xi = b, and 2
n−1 with xi = 1− b.
For what follows, note that for every x ∈ {0, 1}n such that CS(x) = CS′(x), it holds SatS(i, x) =
SatS′(i, x), for all i ∈ V . Therefore, to determine SatS(i) and SatS′(i) we only need to consider the
initial decision vectors x ∈ {0, 1}n where CS(x) 6= CS′(x).
For the equal absolute change property, first consider that i ∈ L∪I and j ∈ M∪F. As cj,S(x) 6= xi and
cj,S′(x) = xi, then CS(x) 6= xi and CS′(x) = xi; hence SatS′(i, x)−SatS(i, x) = 1. If cj,S(x) = xj , then
xj 6= xi, so CS(x) = xj and CS′(x) 6= xj , which implies SatS(j, x)−SatS′(j, x) = 1; and if cj,S(x) 6= xj ,
then xj = xi, so CS(x) 6= xj and CS′(x) = xj , implying SatS′(j, x) − SatS(j, x) = 1. The possible
change of inclinations or decisions of successors of j keeps that CS(x) 6= CS′(x), and this does not
contradicts the above. Thus, by expression (2) we have either SatS′(i)− SatS(i) = SatS′(j)− SatS(j)
or SatS′(i)− SatS(i) = SatS(j)− SatS′(j).
Second, consider i ∈ M. Note that in this case, the inclination of actor i also depends of their
predecessors. To deal with this, just replace xi in all the above equations by ci(x), and note that
ci(x) = ci,S(x) = ci,S′(x), so if xi = ci(x), we obtain the same equations, and if xi 6= ci(x), we ob-
tain that SatS(i, x)− SatS′(i, x) = 1, getting the same final equations that above.
For the opposite gain property, first consider i ∈ L ∪ I and j ∈ I. As it must hold that xi 6= cj , then
CS(x) = xj 6= xi and CS′(x) = xi 6= xj ; hence SatS′(i, x)−SatS(i, x) = 1 and SatS(j, x)−SatS′(j, x) =
1. Second, consider that i ∈ M ∪ F. For this case, just replace xi in all the above equations by ci(x), and
note that ci(x) = ci,S(x) = ci,S′(x), so it holds ci(x) 6= xj , CS(x) = xj and CS′(x) = ci(x); hence,
SatS(j, x) − SatS′(j, x) = 1 and either SatS′(i, x) − SatS(i, x) = 1 or SatS(i, x) − SatS′(i, x) = 1.
Thus, by expression (2) we have either SatS′(i)−SatS(i) = SatS(j)−SatS′(j) or SatS′(i)−SatS(i) =
SatS′(j)− SatS(j).
For the power neutrality for two opinion leaders, first consider i ∈ L ∪ I, j ∈ M ∪ F and h ∈ L.
As |PG(j)| = 1, cj,S(x) = xh, and as |PG′(j)| = 2, cj,S′(x) 6= xj iff xh = xi 6= xj . Let b ∈ {0, 1},
if CS(x) = b and CS′(x) = 1 − b, then cj,S(x) = b = xh and cj,S′(x) = 1 − b = xi = xj , hence
SatS′(i, x)−SatS(i, x) = 1 = SatS(h, x)−SatS′(h, x). The possible change of inclinations of successors
of j keeps that CS(x) 6= CS′(x), and this does not contradicts the above. Thus, by expression (2) we
have SatS′(i)− SatS(i) = SatS(h)− SatS′(h).
Second, consider h ∈ M. For this case, just replace xh in all the above equations by ch(x), and note
that ch(x) = ch,S(x) = ch,S′(x), so either SatS(h, x)− SatS′(h, x) = 1 or SatS′(h, x)− SatS(h, x) = 1.
Finally, consider i ∈ M ∪ F. Replacing xi by ci(x), where ci(x) = ci,S(x) = ci,S′(x), we obtain analogous
equations. Therefore we have either SatS′(i)− SatS(i) = SatS(h)− SatS′(h) or SatS′(i)− SatS(i) =
SatS′(h)− SatS(h). ⊓⊔
Note that the satisfaction normalization of Definition 10 remains the same for OLFM systems, be-
cause the collective decision function is the same. From the previous theorem, since for OLFM systems
the satisfaction score satisfies power neutrality for two opinion leaders, then it also satisfies horizontal
neutrality. In what follows we prove an axiomatization of satisfaction for OLFM systems.
Theorem 4. For OLFM systems, the Sat score is the unique measure that satisfies the properties 1, 2,
3, 4b, 5b, 6 and 7 of Definitions 9, 10 and 13.
Proof. We know by Theorem 3 that in OLFM systems the Sat score satisfies properties 1, 2, 3, 4b, 5b,
6 and 7. To prove uniqueness it remains to show that, on the assumption that f : V → R satisfies the
seven axioms, then this score must be equal to Sat.
By Theorem 2, we know that if there are no mediators —i.e., we have an OLF system—, property
4b is replaced by property 4, so the score is equal to Sat. Now we proceed constructively.
First, given an OLFM system S without mediators, we can transform a follower i in a mediator by
connecting it with an independent actor j, obtaining a new OLFM system S ′. Thus, by property 5b, it
holds either fS′(i) − fS(i) = fS(j) − fS′(j) or fS′(i) − fS(i) = fS′(j) − fS(j). As fS(i) and fS(j) are
uniquely determined by Theorem 2, both equations yield a system of linear equations easy to solve, so
that the unknowns, fS′(i) and fS′(j), can be uniquely determined.
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From the above, note that actor j in S ′ becomes in a follower. And also note that we can transform
step by step other independent actors j in followers, such that PG′(j) = {i}. In each step, satisfaction
score can be uniquely determined by using the same property.
Secondly, suppose that we have an OLFM system S with only one layer of mediation, like the obtained
above, with a follower j ∈ L3 so that PG′(j) = {i}. Now we can transform a follower h ∈ L2 in a mediator,
by connecting it with follower j, obtaining a new OLFM system S ′. Thus, by property 4b, it holds either
fS′(h) − fS(h) = fS(j) − fS′(j) or fS′(h) − fS(h) = fS′(j) − fS(j). This is basically the same kind of
system of linear equations obtained with property 5b), and as fS(h) and fS(j) are uniquely determined,
then fS′(h) and fS′(j) can also be uniquely determined. We can also repeat this process by transforming
new followers h ∈ L2 in mediators, obtaining in each step that satisfaction can be uniquely determined.
Of course, the same kind of transformations can be done to create lower layers, and therefore to
produce any OLFM system.
Finally, note that property 1 implies that there is a constant c ∈ R such that for all i ∈ I, f(i) = c.
Hence, for every OLFM system, we can provide new independent actors and then using them as opinion
leaders, followers or mediators, in such a way that f can always be uniquely determined. ⊓⊔
5 Concluding remarks
We have studied the satisfaction score proposed by [9] for a generalization of OLF systems, namely the
OLFM systems. This generalized model incorporates an additional kind of actors called mediators, that
act at the same time as opinion leaders and followers. Mediators allow the presence of several layers of
influence, and hence they establish a more general hierarchy among the different actors.
By using this generalized model, the main results of this work are two: first, that the properties of
satisfaction for OLF systems support natural generalizations for OLFM systems; and second, that these
properties allow to establish a new axiomatization of the score over the generalized model, when the
collective decision vectors are restricted by the expression (3). This axiomatization extends the results
of [10] for OLF systems.
Interestingly enough, the measure coincides with the well establishedRae index, that is closely related
to the Banzhaf value over the set of monotonic decision functions which can be casted as characteristic
functions of simple games. Equation (1) suggests that through small modifications, such as a change in
the normalization of property 7, it is possible to define an axiomatization of the Banzhaf value for OLFM
systems. In the same vein, note that there exist other axiomatizations of the Banzhaf value for simple
games [13]. Moreover, for OLF systems, [9,10] describe another score called power score, that is very
similar to the satisfaction in terms of the properties that it meets. Analogously to Sat and Rae, the
power score is closely related with the power index called Holler value [19], also studied in the context of
simple game theory. It remains open to study whether the power score also meets the generalized versions
of the properties for OLFM systems, as well as if it admits an axiomatization for this generalized model.
Additionally, it may be interesting to determine how far we can extend the model so that the properties
are still met, and even how far it is possible to establish an axiomatization of the scores. For instance,
we may consider more general collective decision vectors, like the one described by [9]:1
ci =
{
b if |{j ∈ PG(i) | xj = b}| > ⌊q · |PG(i)|⌋,
xi otherwise
where b ∈ {0, 1} and 1/2 ≤ q < 1. This parameter q, the fraction value, represents the fraction of opinion
leaders with the same inclination that is necessary to influence the decision of a follower. Observe that
the unanimity condition corresponds to consider the case when the fraction value q is large enough. Note
also that by Lemma 2, the system remains monotonic. From these generalized collective decision vectors
emerge both the equal absolute change property and the power neutrality for two opinion leaders in OLF
systems.
Another possibility is to consider connections among actors that belongs to not immediately consec-
utive layers. A first approach could be dealing with star mediation influence games, a collective decision
1 In [9] the authors define these collective decision vectors to study the satisfaction score, but they do not define
an axiomatization for the satisfaction in the systems that use them. The known axiomatization that we mention
in this paper is defined in [10] for the collective decision vectors of Definition 8.
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making model proposed in [25]. This model is based on star graphs, so that we have five kind of actors:
a unique mediator that acts as central actor, a set of opinion leaders that point to the mediator, a set
of followers that are influenced by the mediator, another set of actors that point to the mediator and at
the same time are influenced by it, and a set of independent actors. The interesting fact of this model
is that despite it breaks the layered structure of the graphs, it is still simple, because the fraction value
only affects the mediator. Other extremal cases of influence games were introduced in [24].
Finally, as pointed out by [9], other related models that can be considered are games with r alterna-
tives [2,3,4,5] or decision-making situations with several levels of approval in the input and the output,
rather than only one [15,16,17].
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